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Abstract
The literature frequently presents populists and technocrats as antagonistic. Although undoubtedly there are good histor-
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populists are less conflictive than usually assumed and cohabitation a more common outcome than expected. We argue
that two conditions moderate conflict between populists and economic technocrats, leading not only to their cohabita-
tion but to cooperation between them: the programmatic mandate of populists and the economic context of their rise
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1. Introduction
Populists and technocrats are archetypical political
actors in Latin America. Myriad authors have studied the
relevance and power of leaders who garner widespread
support and rule in the name of ‘the people’s’ will.
Juan Peron in Argentina, Getulio Vargas in Brazil, and
more recently, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela are all exam-
ples of this political animal in the region. At the same
time, high-ranking policymakers who claim to adopt
and conduct policies in the name of technical rational-
ity have also attracted significant academic attention.
Be it Money Doctors in the Andes or Chicago, Boys in
Chile, experts, and especially economic experts have also
shaped their polities in meaningful ways (Centeno &
Silva, 1998; Dargent, 2020). Given the long history of
these actors in the region, instead of focusing on techno-
cratic populists, as have other contributions to this the-
matic issue, here we analyse the conditions under which
populists and economic technocrats engage in conflict,
cohabitate, and even cooperate in Latin America.
The literature frequently presents populists and tech-
nocrats as antagonistic. Daniele Caramani, for example,
proposes populism and technocracy as alternative ide-
al forms to party democracy, with “populism stressing
the centrality of a putative will of the people in guiding
political action and technocracy stressing the centrality
of rational speculation in identifying both the goals of a
society and the means to implement them” (Caramani,
2017, p. 54). Caramani also highlights the commonalities
between these ideal forms as examples of “unmediat-
ed politics…between a supposedly unitary and common
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interest of society on the one hand and elites on the oth-
er,” which helps to understand why populists can also
exploit technical objective knowledge to attain popular
legitimacy (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019; de la Torre, 2013;
Guasti & Buštíková, 2020). Nonetheless, it is more com-
mon that in their quest to respond to the will of ‘the peo-
ple’ populists clash with technical and scientific recom-
mendations from policy experts.
Are populists and experts inherently opposed?
In Latin America, this question often takes a more
specific form and focuses on economic technocrats.
Economic technocrats usually are equated with ortho-
dox economists promoting neoliberal policies and as
being antagonistic to left-wing policies. We do not fol-
low this approach. It is a mistake to equate orthodoxy
with expertise; the region provides numerous examples
of heterodox economic technocrats. In this article, eco-
nomic experts can be orthodox or heterodox, but to be
powerful, they must have control over economic poli-
cy; in particular, assure a balanced public deficit that
proves they are capable of limiting populist leaders’ prof-
ligate use of public funds to advance political goals. Some
scholars studying Latin America even resort to the notion
of “economic populism” to refer to a tendency among
populist presidents and leaders to engage in unrestrict-
ed spending, with little regard for technical and fiscal
limits, often leading to inflationary cycles (Acemoglu,
Egorov, & Sonin, 2013; Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991;
Sachs, 1989).
In answering this question, it is critical to under-
stand who can be considered a populist politician and a
technocrat. Building on Levitsky and Loxton (2013), we
define populist politicians as those who mobilize sup-
port through anti-establishment appeals, who are typ-
ically outsiders to the political system, and who tend
to reject the intermediation and controls from liberal
democratic institutions by claiming to represent ‘the will
of the people.’ These anti-establishment appeals in the
case of classical populism were directed against elites,
the rich, or the powerful, those preventing the people
from participating in politics and improving their stan-
dard of living. More recently, as discussed by Weyland,
populists have directed their criticisms towards the polit-
ical establishment represented by ossified political par-
ties or partidocracia (Weyland, 2001, 2003). As discussed
below, depending on the type of social demands being
addressed by populists, these discourses could adopt a
left-wing or right-wing discourse.
Technocrats, on the other hand, are distinguished
from other political actors by their higher level of
expertise certified by their specialized academic train-
ing (Centeno & Silva, 1998, p. 2; Williams, 2006, p. 119).
David Collier’s classic definition captures this character-
istic of technocrats: “Individuals with a high level of spe-
cialized academic training which serves as a principal cri-
terion on the basis of which they are selected to occupy
key decision-making or advisory roles in large, complex
organizations—both public and private” (Collier, 1979,
p. 403). Expertise is the crucial attribute that technocrats
exploit to legitimize themselves as objective public ser-
vants, immune to ideological biases. Of course, we know
well that expertise claims can be used to downplay quite
strong ideological biases, but, in political discourse, these
policies are presented as objective and neutral.
From these definitions, we can derive at least two
potential sources of conflict with technocrats built into
the very concept of a populist politician. First, populists
in power tend to have a fragile political coalition made up
of politicians glued together only by their opposition to
the establishment. This same anti-establishment stance
usually prevents Latin American populists from making
alliances with existing parties to secure their grasp on
power. Hence, populists rely to a much larger extent on
popular support than non-populist politicians to keep
members of their party in check and their adversaries
at bay, which makes them particularly wary of advice
that could harm their approval numbers and their poten-
tial pool of voters. Consequently, economic technocrats,
who under certain circumstances may advocate unpop-
ular yet ‘economically sound’ measures, can be uncom-
fortable partners for populists.
Second, the outsider status of the prototypical pop-
ulists and their anti-establishment appeals are sources
of tension with technocrats. On the one hand, given their
outsider status, populists do not have the necessary net-
works to recruit or trust experts with government expe-
rience. On the other hand, and especially when people
perceive experts as closely tied to the establishment that
populists rallied against, breaking with experts, it can be
a signalling mechanism to voters that populists are seri-
ous about their intentions to punish said establishment
and take their country in a different direction.
Although undoubtedly there are good historical
examples that confirm this tension, in this article we
propose that the relationship between economic tech-
nocrats and populists is less conflictive than usually
assumed and cohabitation a more common outcome
than expected. We argue that two conditions moderate
conflict between populists and economic technocrats,
leading not only to their cohabitation but to coopera-
tion between them: the programmatic mandate of pop-
ulists and the economic context of their rise to power.
This does not mean that populists will not have other ten-
sions with technocrats in different policy areas (health,
commerce, environment, integration), but points to cer-
tain fundamental limits to populist power regarding eco-
nomic management.
The next section explains the logic by which we
claim these two conditions change the incentive struc-
ture and the resources available for populists to act
in confrontation with economic technocrats. Section 3,
the article’s core, analyses the relations of economic
experts with nine populist presidents in contemporary
Latin America to show the soundness of this argument.
We conclude discussing the limitations and implications
of our main assertions.
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2. The Political Economy of Populist and Technocratic
Relations
In this article, we claim that populists and economic
technocrats can cooperate, cohabitate, or be in con-
flict. By s‘cooperation,’ we mean that populists and tech-
nocrats will have a close relationship that will grant the
latter significant leeway and power to shape public policy
in economic issues. In situations of ‘cohabitation,’ pop-
ulists will neither empower nor give autonomy to eco-
nomic technocrats, but will not remove them from office,
and will respect the budgetary limits adopted by finance
ministries. Finally, ‘conflict’ refers to instances when pop-
ulists remove economic technocrats from their positions,
personalize economic decision-making, and appoint loy-
alists with little experience or credentials, and hence less
autonomy vis-à-vis the President.
What makes populists and technocrats engage in
these different dynamics? The first condition to consid-
er is the nature of the populist leader’s programmatic
mandate. Although populism in Latin America since the
times of Juan Peron and Getulio Vargas has been associ-
ated with redistributive leaders, the advent of populists
who implemented a ‘neoliberal’ and security-centred
program during the 1990s made clear that right-wing
leaders can use similar mobilization strategies and dis-
courses as those used by ‘classic’ populists (Roberts,
1995; Weyland, 1996, 1999). Furthermore, recent devel-
opments in the literature that consider populism as
an ideological phenomenon in itself, also recognize its
capacity to work through different “host ideologies”
(Colodro, Cachafeiro, & Marné, 2018; Huber & Ruth,
2017; Huber & Schimpf, 2017; Mudde, 2004; Mudde &
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).
In this article, we do not focus on the ideology as an
attribute of populist leaders but on their mandate. Some
populist politicians will have a more defined ideological
profile than others, but all populists who rise to power
do so in a context that binds them to a mandate. Their
ascent is usually preceded by some kind of crisis and the
convergence on the part of established parties around
a similar programmatic position to confront it, blurring
the differences between them and leaving an opening for
populist challengers to outflank them from the right or
left (Lupu, 2016; Roberts, 2015; Slater & Simmons, 2013;
Weyland, 2002). Hence, the nature of the crisis, and the
choices made by established parties to confront it, shape
the kind of mandate populists are likely to be given when
voted into office.
We propose that programmatic mandates are vital
because they shape the voting base and the core con-
stituency that will support populists in power. In turn,
these introduce different incentive structures for pop-
ulists to break with economic technocrats. Populists with
a right-wing mandate build their relationship with their
voters over issues that are not related to distributive
policies, precisely because the crises that they rise from
are related to security deficiencies or severe econom-
ic mismanagement. Their core constituency, a concept
which refers to the social sectors that are the most impor-
tant for a party’s political agenda and resource mobiliza-
tion (Gibson, 1996), is composed of economic elites and
external actors such as foreign investors or multilater-
al agencies, which provide them with the stability and
resources needed to remain in power. As a consequence,
they are more likely to cooperate with economic tech-
nocrats. The populist base will not reject them as fierce-
ly, and their presence will signal to the constituency that
their interests will be protected.
Unlike right-wing populists, who in the region usual-
ly rise to power in the context of a security crisis, those
with left-wing mandates ride the waves of economic dis-
content that hit the lower-income groups hardest. Since
these populists accumulate support on the promise to
end the historical and structural economic injustices that
are characteristic of Latin America (Weyland, 2013), low-
er classes are more amenable to become their most sig-
nificant supporters.
A lower-class coalition and a redistributive agenda,
however, does not preclude them from working along-
side technocrats. It is their need to swiftly fulfil this
promise, which leads to a push for a quick and vast expan-
sion in spending and hence puts them on a path of con-
flict with economic technocrats. Furthermore, their core
constituency is typically composed of organizations such
as labour unions and local industrialists, who seek tar-
geted benefits and protections, and who are usually con-
ceived as ‘rent-seekers’ by economic technocrats. Hence,
voters and key constituencies will produce more ten-
sion between economic technocrats and populists with
a redistributive mandate, leading to conflict.
This inclination to conflict, however, is moderated
by contextual restrictions on spending. Being part of
what dependency theorists called ‘the periphery,’ Latin
American economies are heavily conditioned by develop-
ments in industrialized countries. The booms and busts
in commodity prices usually play the role in enabling
and disabling the conditions for the state to be able to
quickly attend to redistributive demands and thus affect
populists’ political opportunities (Weyland, 2020). Crises
that follow from commodity busts often lead to the
appointment of technocrats or support their continuity.
This pattern, by which economic crises lead to technical
appointments, has been observed in Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, México, and Peru at times in the late 1980s and
early 1990s (Kaplan, 2013, pp. 53–54; Teichman, 1997,
2004; Weyland, 2002). Adverse economic conditions will
limit populists’ capacity to discard experts and lead to
what we call ‘cohabitation’ between left-wing populists
and economic technocrats.
Economic booms, on the other hand, lead to con-
flict by enabling left-wing populists and allow them to
fire economic technocrats. This does not mean that the
relation between right-wing populists and experts will
not be affected by economic booms. As discussed lat-
er, a change to more positive external economic condi-
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tions can augment tensions between right-wing leaders
and experts. Nevertheless, while left-wing populists use
this opening to dismantle technocracy, those on the right
will not be as aggressive. Unlike left-wing populists, right-
wing populists’ mandates do not push them to imple-
ment redistributive measures or set them in a path of
confrontation with economic elites. Hence, the interna-
tional economic context plays a role in enabling or dis-
abling populist’s inclination to enter into conflict with
economic technocrats.
We summarize the expected outcomes of the rela-
tionship between populism, programmatic mandate,
and the global economic environment in Figure 1.
We present this argument by analysing the relation-
ship between nine populist presidents and economic
technocrats in contemporary Latin America. Two criteria,
one temporal and the other spatial, guided this selection.
First, we selected populism cases starting in the era of
market reforms in the region during the late 1980s. This
timeframe gives us a period with significant variation in
the programmatic mandate populists received and the
kind of international economic environment they con-
fronted. Additionally, economic technocrats became a
more salient feature of the region during these decades
than during the first half of the twentieth century, when
classic populism took hold.
Second, we limit ourselves to cases within South
America, which is our regional expertise. This choice
excludes other potential cases such as those of Daniel
Ortega in Nicaragua, Manuel Zelaya in Honduras, Mireya
Moscoso in Panamá, or Hipólito Mejía in the Dominican
Republic. Given that the empirical support for our argu-
ment comes mainly from within-case evidence rather
than from large-N correlational analysis, regional exper-
tise was an important criterion for case selection.
Empirically, our conclusions are thus limited to South
America. Theoretically, however, there is nothing about
our argument that prevents it from ‘travelling’ and being
tested beyond this subregion.
From the scope of cases within these criteria, we
excluded two populists, both from Ecuador. Abdalá
Bucaram (1996–1997) ruled for less than six months, and
hence it is not possible to distinguish a clear governing
pattern in that timeframe. The second exclusion, Rafael
Correa’s administration, has been labelled as a case of
“technocratic populism” by authors such as de la Torre
(2013). By this term, he refers to the combination of a
populist discourse and a governing logic that bases the
legitimacy of its actions on the technocratic credentials
of its leader. However, this article does not study techno-
cratic populism, but the coexistence of technocrats and
populists in government. Since Correa embodies both of
these actors in power, it is impossible to think of a coun-
terfactual scenario in which the populist and the techno-
cratic orientations do not coexist, making it an irrelevant
case for empirical testing.
The cases exhibit variation in the programmatic man-
date and on the international economic environment
in which they governed. Carlos Ménem in Argentina
(1989–1999), Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) in Peru,
Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil (1990–1992), and
Alvaro Uribe (2002–2010) in Colombia are four cas-
es of right-wing mandates. Among our five cases of
left-wing populists, three rose to power during strin-
gent economic conditions. Lucio Gutierrez (2002–2005)
in Ecuador ruled during a financial duress period
and cohabitated with technocrats during his term.
Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) in Venezuela and Néstor
Kirchner (2003–2007) in Argentina eventually enjoyed
the benefits of a commodity boom, leading to conflict
with experts. Finally, in Argentina, Cristina Fernández
(2007–2015) initiated her rule during a period of few













Figure 1. Conditions affecting populists and economic technocrats’ relationships and their expected outcomes.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 509–519 512
Table 1 presents the different cases considered, as
well as their expected outcomes. Although we consid-
er nine presidents, we analyse 11 cases, as some of
these presidencies divide into two periods to capture
the variation of the international economic environment
throughout their tenure. We code these populist presi-
dencies in terms of their programmatic mandate and of
the international economic environment they confront-
ed. Ten of the 11 cases fit our prediction, the excep-
tion being the case of Bolivian President Evo Morales.
We will use this case as it is an opportunity to high-
light some additional domestic factors that can affect the
relationship between experts and populists, which we
believe account for why this case did not fit our expect-
ed outcome.
3. Cooperation: Right-Wing Populists and Technocrats
The cases of the right-wing populists Álvaro Uribe in
Colombia, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Collor de Mello in
Brazil, and Carlos Ménem in Argentina illustrate the high-
er likelihood of cooperation between experts and pop-
ulists. In all cases, experts were fundamental to signal
these populists’ economic prudence to the right-wings’
ruling coalitions.
Alvaro Uribe broke with the Liberal Party to run as an
independent in the 2002 election. Uribe sharply criticized
the weak stance of the two traditional—and until then
dominant—parties (Liberals and Conservatives) against
guerrilla groups. The failure of a peace process led by a
Conservative president deepened the fracture of citizens
from their political elite. This crisis delegitimized both
parties and allowed Uribe to win the Presidency with
a securitization agenda and a strong anti-leftist rhetoric
(Gutiérrez, 2006). Lacking a political party and running
on an anti-establishment ticket, Uribe built alliances
with other independent politicians and sought to secure
a large voting coalition that would allow him to rule
with little need for partisan negotiations (Dugas, 2003).
Although there was no acute economic crisis in Colombia
at the time of his election, Uribe quickly assured business
actors that he would guarantee economic stability and
fiscal prudence, enhancing his support.
Some authors, such as Dugas (2003), do not consid-
er Uribe a populist, mainly due to his lack of charisma.
We do not deem charisma a defining feature of populism,
and Uribe’s behaviour during the electoral campaign and
administration fits our definition. As mentioned, he pre-
sented himself as an outsider challenging the political
establishment, railing against ‘politiquería’ in the coun-
try, and used public support to defy limits imposed by
liberal institutions.
Throughout his two terms in office (2002–2006;
2006–2010), Uribe respected the five-decade-long
Colombian tradition of appointing experts in the Ministry
of Finance and the National Planning Department, even
when he was popular enough to break it with few con-
sequences. Although he increased some social programs
that reinforced his close relationship with the citizenry,
leading to some public clashes with his finance minis-
ters, in general Uribe was very careful to show that he
accepted technocratic oversight and that he was commit-
ted to prudent economic management (Dargent, 2015,
Chapter 4). These measures guaranteed him support,
albeit sometimes unenthusiastic, from business and
international actors.
In 1990, Peru faced a double crisis: a hyperinflation-
ary economy and an internal war against the Shining
Path, a Maoist guerrilla organization. Fujimori, a com-
plete outsider, won that year’s election by surprise part-
ly due to the delegitimization of political parties. His
mandate was not originally right-wing. On the contrary,
what took him to the Presidency in the second round
of the election were the votes of leftists and centrists
opposed to the radical market liberalization program pro-
posed by his right-wing opponent, novelist Mario Vargas
Llosa. Nonetheless, immediately after winning, Fujimori
moved to the right as he realized he needed a right-wing
core constituency to stabilize his grasp on power. First,
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) conditioned any
Table 1. Cases, moderating conditions, and expected outcomes.
Moderating Conditions Outcomes
Programmatic International Economic
Cases Mandate Environment Expected Actual
Carlos Ménem (1989–1999) Right-Wing Disabling Cooperation Cooperation
Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) Right-Wing Disabling Cooperation Cooperation
Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010) Right-Wing Enabling Cooperation Cooperation
Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–1992) Right-Wing Disabling Cooperation Cooperation
Hugo Chávez (1999–2003) Left-Wing Disabling Cohabitation Cohabitation
N. Kirchner (2003–2005) Left-Wing Disabling Cohabitation Cohabitation
Lucio Gutierrez (2003–2005) Left-Wing Disabling Cohabitation Cohabitation
N. Kirchner (2005–2007) Left-Wing Enabling Conflict Conflict
Hugo Chávez (2004–2013) Left-Wing Enabling Conflict Conflict
Cristina Fernández (2007–2015) Left-Wing Enabling Conflict Conflict
Evo Morales (2006–2019) Left-Wing Enabling Conflict Cohabitation
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external loan to the adoption of market reforms and
shock treatment. Second, Fujimori aligned with the mili-
tary to confront the Shining Path and adopted hard-line
securitization rhetoric. Fujimori blamed traditional par-
ties for the economic disaster and the failed war against
terrorism. In 1992, the President closed Congress in a
self-coup and increased his popularity while solidifying
the support of business actors and the military. Following
international pressure from IFIs and the Organization of
American States, Fujimori organized elections in which
he won a congressional majority and solidified his pow-
er. In 1995, he won the Presidency with 64% of the vote,
a result not previously seen in the first electoral round in
Peru (Weyland, 1996, 2002).
Fujimori relied on orthodox economic experts to ini-
tiate profound market reforms that drastically changed
the Peruvian state structure. During most of his two
administrations (and some months into his third and
unconstitutional term), Fujimori appointed experts in
the Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF). They
were widely seen as a guarantee of economic stabil-
ity for businesses and voters who had been trauma-
tised by financial mismanagement. Additionally, officers
influenced by securitization doctrines of the autocra-
cies of the Southern Cone dominated the Armed Forces.
Interestingly, the President and some of his military allies
had little orthodox economic convictions. Nonetheless,
they accepted MEF restrictions, understanding that busi-
ness’ and IFI’s support were crucial for their stability
(Dargent, 2015, Chapter 5).
Fernando Collor de Mello was elected President of
Brazil in 1989 after a meteoric ascent in the polls. He had
come to power as an outsider, distancing himself from
Brazilian political parties, and promising to end the cor-
ruption enabled by the political establishment. The sour-
ing of public opinion against the political system came
as a result of corruption scandals, meagre economic
growth, and economic mismanagement that resulted in
hyperinflation (Weyland, 1993). This crisis not only pro-
duced the conditions for the rise of an outsider like Collor
but also generated a widespread consensus around the
need for drastic measures to reform the Brazilian econo-
my and change the development strategy, including aus-
terity measures (Schneider, 1991).
Upon taking office, Collor de Mello appointed Zélia
Cardoso de Mello, an economics professor, as finance
minister. She was in charge of overseeing the implemen-
tation of the New Brazil Plan, a set of policies designed to
curb inflation, which became known as the ‘Plan Collor.’
As many stabilization policy packages around the region
at that time, the plan included privatizations, reductions
in public employment, and the elimination of subsidies
to public utilities. Economic reform plans were conduct-
ed with significant autonomy and even isolation from
political forces. In this sense, Collor not only cohabitated
with economic technocrats, their relationship was one
of cooperation. It was partly the exclusive reliance on
economic technocrats that led to the erosion of Collor’s
political and social support coalition and the inability
of the government to get the labour and business sec-
tors to cooperate with the government (Schneider, 1991).
It was this isolation that eventually laid the ground for
Collor’s fall. After his plans to turn the Brazilian econ-
omy around failed, and without allies or popular sup-
port on his side, he resigned in December of 1992 before
Congress voted for his removal from office, amid accusa-
tions of corruption.
Finally, Carlos Ménem (1989–1999) also exemplifies
the tendency among populists with a right-wing man-
date to cooperate with technocrats. Menem won the
Presidency as the Justicialista Party candidate, a politi-
cal organization associated with Peronismo, which in the
history of Argentina has usually meant left-wing redis-
tributive policies. Nonetheless, Menem reached pow-
er with the electoral mandate to end the hyperinfla-
tionary crisis that had caused a premature ending of
his predecessor’s government (Weyland, 2002). After
some initial failures to end the crisis, in 1991 Menem
appointed Domingo Cavallo, a neoliberal technocrat, as
Economic Minister. Cavallo adopted an ambitious mar-
ket reform to stop inflation and privatize public enter-
prises. Privatization allowed Menem to build a support
coalition with business sectors while weakening the
support of more traditional Peronist rival leaderships
(Weyland, 2003, p. 1100). The government successful-
ly reduced inflation, which gave Menem the political
space to reform the Constitution to allow re-election for
one term (although reducing presidential terms from six
years to four). This technocratic guidance of macroeco-
nomic policy did not prevent Menem from using clien-
telistic strategies to build alliances and win electoral sup-
port. In 1995, Menem won re-election with 49.9% of the
vote, 20 points over his closest rival.
After winning re-election, Menem continued his col-
laboration with Cavallo. New economic problems lead
to a change in the Ministry of Economics in 1996, but
Cavallo’s replacement, Roque Fernández, was also a
neoliberal technocrat who achieved similar influence
and stability. Fernández kept the position until the end
of Menem’s government.
In sum, right-wing populists, due to their original
mandate and the nature of their coalitions, have fewer
incentives to clash with technocrats. As discussed later
for the case of Fujimori, the change in economic condi-
tions can lead to some tension between Presidents and
experts, but usually not to conflict.
4. Cohabitation: Left-Wing Populists, Resource Scarcity,
and Technocrats
As mentioned, left-wing populists win elections with a
mandate to subvert political orders perceived as unjust
and exclusionary. Economic duress attributed to the
failed stabilization plans of right-wing governments and
the convergence by traditionally left-wing parties on
these policies create the opening for leftist leaders to
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reach power. Nonetheless, the international environ-
ment moderates this conflict. Reaching power under con-
ditions of economic duress will make populists more cau-
tious in their handling of the economy and more likely to
cohabitate with experts to signal financial responsibility.
This support will not be enthusiastic, and we can expect
more clashes than in the previous cases, but toleration is
more likely than conflict.
Three of our five leftist leaders faced this econom-
ic restraint. The late 1990s propelled left-wing populists
to power and limited their capacity to fulfil the promise
of redistribution once in office. Hugo Chávez, Lucio
Gutierrez, and Néstor Kirchner all won the Presidency
with distributive mandates, and all of them, initial-
ly, appointed experts in their ministries of finance.
While Gutierrez was never able to break this cohabi-
tation, Chávez and Kirchner eventually fired experts to
appoint loyalists.
In Ecuador, Lucio Gutierrez won the 2002 presiden-
tial election on an anti-establishment platform and, in
alliance with movements and parties to the left of the
political spectrum, promised to put an end to austeri-
ty policies and increase social protection. The country,
albeit inconsistently (Pachano, 2007), had implement-
ed market-oriented reforms in the previous decade and
then faced an economic crisis that put the country in
a recession.
This scenario made Gutierrez’s ascent to power more
likely, but also made it more challenging to keep his
promises once in office. Gutierrez tried to keep his pop-
ulist coalition in place by pushing an ‘anti-corruption’
agenda that sought to signal his commitment to punish
political and economic elites, and he switched to aus-
terity policies in the financial realm. Upon taking office,
Gutierrez named Mauricio Pozo as finance minister. Pozo,
an economist from the University of Notre Dame, at
the time, had a decade of experience at Ecuador’s
Central Bank. Soon after that, his administration signed
an agreement with the IMF to receive financial support.
Gutierrez’s allies on the left saw this as a sign of a plot
by elite ‘techno-bureaucrats’ rooted in the state appara-
tus, with links to the international and private financial
sectors (Buendía, 2004, pp. 71–72).
Three months after assuming office, Gutierrez
explained the rationale behind his decisions. He argued
the economic crisis left little room for redistributive poli-
cies, emphasizing the need to cut spending and recover
the country’s credibility vis-à-vis foreign investors and
international organizations, which became key actors for
a country in search of relief (“Entrevista con el Presidente
Constitucional”, 2003). Gutierrez, however, did not last
long in power. After being unable to secure a strong coali-
tion to support him, he abandoned the Presidency and
left the country in 2005 amid a popular revolt against
his Presidency.
Chávez’s stance against technocratic elites was root-
ed in the mandate upon which he was elected into office.
Amid a prolonged economic crisis and a series of cor-
ruption scandals that eroded voters’ trust in established
parties, Chavez came to power railing against them and
claiming that power needed to be taken away from polit-
ical and technocratic elites and given back to ‘the peo-
ple’ (Hawkins, 2010). However, the replacement of tech-
nocrats with loyalists was not immediate, nor was it with-
out setbacks. Upon taking office, Chávez decided to leave
Maritza Izaguirre, an appointee of his predecessor in pow-
er, in charge of the Finance Ministry. Chávez had come
to the office during one of the worst economic crises
the country had ever experienced. Oil, the government’s
most important revenue source, was at US $9 per barrel
in 1998, down from the US $29 it had enjoyed in 1981.
Consequently, the government initially focused on
fiscal adjustment and provided international investors
with guarantees of contract stability and the possibil-
ity of international arbitration of disputes (Corrales &
Penfold-Becerra, 2011, p. 51). Izaguirre’s appointment
was meant to signal to creditors and economic agents
that the administration sought to maintain some stabil-
ity amid low economic performance and uncertainty sur-
rounding Chávez’s new direction (Kelly & Palma, 2004,
p. 218). The same crisis that had helped propel Chávez to
power also constrained him from breaking with the past.
Six months after taking office, and with signs of
a recovering economy, Chávez removed Izaguirre from
the Ministry of Finance. He appointed three different
finance ministers between late 1999 and early 2002: José
Rojas, Nelson Merentes, and Francisco Usón. Rojas was
a low-level bureaucrat before Chávez’s Presidency, and
Merentes a mathematician who was also a member of
the National Tactical Command of Chávez’s party, the
MVR (Weyland, 2001, p. 81). Usón, for his part, was a
retired general, part of the coalition of military and for-
mer military that had joined the new administration.
However, this attempt to break with economic
experts would not last, as the performance of the
economy was still irregular, and domestic turmoil had
again pushed the country into recession. In early
2002, Chávez appointed a University of Chicago-trained
economist, Felipe Pérez Martí, to the Ministry of Planning.
Similarly, Usón was replaced as the finance minister by
Tobias Nóbrega, an economist and a professor at the
Universidad Central de Venezuela and the Universidad
Andres Bello. The changes aimed at seeking a way out of
the severe economic crisis that was consuming the coun-
try (Vera, 2015, p. 546). Part of the new policy package
that Pérez and Nóbrega put forward included new tax-
es and slashes to the national budget. Upon announcing
the new measures to the nation, Pérez highlighted the
critical condition of the economy, and that these initia-
tives were consulted with domestic and foreign special-
ists (“Venezuela anuncia medidas económicas,” 2002).
Néstor Kirchner won the 2003 Argentinean elec-
tion with a clear leftist mandate. There were doubts
about how Kirchner would handle the economy, but, as
President, he cohabitated with experts during his first
year. To understand this outcome, one has to look back
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at the antecedents and the effects of the 1999 financial
crisis in Argentina.
Orthodox economic technocrats had dominated the
Ministry of Finance throughout the 1990s. These experts
were associated with neoliberal reforms, which stopped
the country’s hyperinflationary crisis. When orthodox
economists were blamed for the 1999 financial crisis,
their prestige was severely weakened. The crisis not only
profoundly affected the popularity of outgoing President
Carlos Ménem (1989–1999) but also ended up with the
Presidency of Fernando de la Rúa when he was forced to
resign due to his insistence on orthodox measures to con-
trol the crisis (1999–2001; Weyland, 2002, pp. 202–204).
After several presidents appointed by Congress
resigned in the following weeks, Eduardo Duhalde was
able to achieve some stability upon taking office in
January 2002 and finish De la Rua’s term. Duhalde
appointed the heterodox economist Roberto Lavagna as
Minister of Economics. Lavagna modified some ortho-
dox policies while maintaining prudent economic man-
agement (Panizza, 2014, p. 33).
As a sign of commitment to economic stability,
incoming President Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007) main-
tained Lavagna in his position. Nonetheless, when the cri-
sis receded and Kirchner achieved a landslide victory in
the November 2005 legislative elections, the President
asked for Lavagna’s resignation. According to Kaplan,
Kirchner behaved more cautiously than Chávez due to
the fear of a hyperinflationary crisis due to a traumat-
ic crisis in Argentina’s recent history, but he still fired
heterodox experts and increased funding for his support
coalition (Kaplan, 2013, pp. 3–5).
Concluding, experts and populists’ cohabitation is
even possible when left-wing populists are constrained
by international conditions, as the previous cases show.
The tension between populists and technocrats can
emerge and lead to conflict. We turn in the last section
to analyse this relation.
5. Conflict: Left-Wing Populists, Resource Abundance,
and Technocrats
As discussed earlier, when the international economic
context is propitious, there is a higher possibility of con-
flict between experts and populists. Both the cases of
Hugo Chavez and Nestor Kirchner and the continuity of
populism under Cristina Fernández show the higher like-
lihood of conflict introduced by this condition.
The previous section showed how Chávez could not
immediately break with economic experts. However, he
eventually did. During his tenure, inflation remained
among the highest in the region, going from an annu-
al rate of 35.8% when he took office in 1999 to 40.6%
in 2013 when he passed away, and then climbing to
65,000% in 2018.
Pérez Martí was removed from the Ministry of
Planning in April 2003. According to him, his market-
friendly policies lost the President’s support following
the strike by oil workers and managers of Petróleos de
Venezuela S.A., after which hard-line positions made
gains within his administration (Barráez, 2019). These
changes coincided with a significant shift in the interna-
tional scenario. The invasion of Iraq by the US in March
of 2003 and the rise of China and India would contribute
to a surge in oil prices starting in 2003. Nobrega left
the finance ministry in December of 2004, amid reports
of months of discomfort with the government’s direc-
tion (Webb-Vidal, 2004). From then on, Chávez’s gov-
ernment would run large deficits and maintain an over-
valued exchange rate, planting the seed for the future
economic collapse and hyperinflation. Later, Pérez Marti
would point at the booming oil prices as the primary rea-
son why the government could sustain these policies and
avoid the consequences, which were made evident once
oil prices went down again after Chávez’s death in 2013
(Pérez Martí, 2013).
As mentioned, once the economy had favourable
international conditions and achieved a stronger polit-
ical coalition in the 2005 legislative elections, Néstor
Kirchner stopped accepting the limits imposed by eco-
nomic experts. Kirchner personalized economic decision-
making and reduced technical capacity in financial insti-
tutions. From then on, his finance ministers were mostly
loyalists. Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner succeeded her
husband and maintained his coalition, further moving it
to the left and increasing personalistic economic man-
agement. During her administration, these tendencies
radicalized as the international context remained propi-
tious (Kaplan, 2013, pp. 3–4; Redrado, 2010).
Interestingly, in both cases, Argentina and Venezuela,
we see that a return to technocratic rule did not happen
when economic conditions worsened. Deteriorating con-
ditions did not move Chavez or Kirchner back to techno-
cratic cohabitation or cooperation. As we point out in the
conclusion, it seems that once the cohabitation between
left-wing populists and technocrats is broken, reconcil-
iation seems unlikely. The risk of weakening a political
coalition dependent on public funds, especially in what
are likely to be difficult political times, makes populists
maintain their grip over economic policy.
Right-wing populists, on the other hand, usually
remain within technocratic cooperation or, at most,
move towards cohabitation, even under favourable
economic conditions. In 1999, under more favourable
economic conditions and while seeking a third—and
unconstitutional—term, Fujimori fired his orthodox
Minister of Finance, Jorge Camet, and appointed a loyal-
ist without similar economic credentials, Víctor Joy Way.
Nevertheless, he did keep other technocrats within the
ministry in place and later that same year, when the
1999 financial crisis hit Peru, Fujimori moved back to
full cooperation.
To conclude, we discuss the case of leftist populist
Evo Morales (2006–2019) to explain why we believe it
does not fit our model’s expected outcome. According
to our model, Morales should have had a conflictive
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relationship with economic technocrats. Nonetheless, on
macroeconomic matters, Morales respected technical-
economic guidance. His finance minister, Luis Arce, kept
the position during almost all of Morales’ Tenure (January
2006–June 2017; January 2019–November 2019).
In this case, we believe, cohabitation is rooted in
two factors: hyperinflationary taboos and personal link-
ages. First, Kaplan (2018) highlights how previous crises
in the 1980s increased the perceived political costs of
hyperinflation and prevented the personalization and de-
professionalization of management at the Ministry of
Finance. Arce’s presence signalled economic prudence
towards elites and citizens. Second, in this case, there is a
relevant factor which is quite difficult to generalize: per-
sonal linkages. Morales was known for building strong
relationships of trust with some of his collaborators, Arce
being one of them. This personal trust is illustrated by the
fact that, after leaving office in 2019 amid a popular upris-
ing and a soft military coup d’état, Morales handpicked
Arce as his successor to run for the Presidency under the
Movimiento al Socialismo ticket in 2020.
6. Conclusion
In this brief piece, we have presented two main ideas
about populists and their relationship with experts. First,
even if seen as inimical, there are a variety of instances
in which populists cohabitate and even cooperate with
technocrats. Populists with right-wing mandates have
fewer incentives to clash with experts, as economic tech-
nocrats can be quite useful for signalling commitment
to prudent economic policy to their governing coalitions.
Moreover, even in the case of left-wing populists with
redistributive mandates, the international context will
moderate the tension between these actors. The first
conclusion of the article is that experts and populists are
not inherently at odds.
A second closely related idea is that these find-
ings question descriptions of populists as ideological
zealots, capable of breaking all limits no matter the con-
sequences. Dependent on their support coalitions and
international economic conditions, we find a more ratio-
nal and calculating political actor than expected, even
in the case of left-wing actors with a mandate for swift
redistribution. The irrational profligate populist seems
more a result of favourable international economic con-
ditions permitting high levels of spending than of ide-
ological commitments. Once leftist populists break up
with experts and build distributive support coalitions,
it seems quite difficult for them to reappoint technical
ministers and move back into economic prudence with-
out risking the support of these coalitions. Some path-
dependence mechanisms seem to be at work, but laying
them out with precision would require further research.
Finally, the case of Evo Morales shows that the two
conditions that we identify are not the only ones affect-
ing the relationship between technocrats and populists.
Other domestic and, to some extent, idiosyncratic factors
can play a role as well. Beyond Morales’ personal trust in
his finance minister, recent memory of an economic col-
lapse, such as a hyperinflation crisis, will make elites and
voters aware that profligate spending can open the door
to new crises (Kaplan, 2013, 2018). Economic experts can
be perceived as a signal to elites and citizens of respon-
sible economic policy, thus increasing the cost of firing
them (Dargent, 2015).
However, this barrier does not seem to be insur-
mountable. The Argentinian cases prove that, although
memories of past inflationary crises can moderate pop-
ulists’ handling of the economy, under favourable inter-
national economic conditions Kirchner and Fernández
relaxed constraints over public deficits and discarded
technocrats. Although Morales’ exception is worth not-
ing and explaining, we think programmatic mandates
and the international economic context have significant
power in explaining the relationship between economic
technocrats and populists in Latin America.
Lastly, our analysis can have implications for other
realms of public policy under populist administrations.
In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, cases of con-
flict between populists and health experts, such as those
seen in Trump and Bolsonaro’s administration in the US
and Brazil, have sparked questions about the relationship
between populist presidents and willingness to listen to
science. The experience with economic experts reveals
that populists are more willing to do so when it does not
clash with the fulfilment of their mandate or when they
face significant restrictions on their governing options in
the absence of experts. This experience suggests that,
rather than looking at populists’ response to the pandem-
ic as ideologically driven, research on this subject should
focus on how the incentives and restrictions in place
condition their policy response to the virus. Ultimately,
this means focusing on what kinds of sentiments and
demands brought them to power and the strength of
the social and political coalitions around health experts
vis-à-vis those supporting populists in power.
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